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1. Kahn, Cooperation in Space Versus the Nuclear Race, S-12-228 SPACE WORLD 2
(December 1982). Over 1,100 spacecraft are now stationed in geosynchronous orbit-22,300
nautical miles above the earth. In this orbit a satellite travels at precisely the same speed as
the earth is rotating, thus remaining continuously "parked" over the same point on the
ground. The U.S. has a majority of its most valuable space assets in geosynchronous orbit.
For example, the Air Force communications channels hosted on satellites (AFSATCOM)
and the Navy Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLSATCOM) are parked in geosyn-
chronous orbit. The Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, which constitute a part of
the nation's command, control, communications and intelligence (C 31) system are also in this
orbit, carrying infrared sensors to continuously monitor the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the
Soviet Union, and China in search of the "early warning" rocket heat of an ICBM or SLBM
launch. THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, CHALLENGES FOR U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY 85, 119 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE REPORT]. Additionally,
the Department of Defense has its Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) in
geosynchronous orbit. This system consists of four satellites and two spares which provide
"worldwide point-to-point communications for fixed ground stations." Bell, America's Other
Space Program, Q-4-196 SPACE WORLD 4, 7 (1980) (reprinted from THE SCIENCES, Decem-
ber 1979). Moreover, six of the eighteen planned 1,000 pound satellites for the new NAV-
STAR Global Positioning System (NAVSTAR GPS) were already in orbit as of October,
1982. The remainder of the spacecraft are scheduled to be in operation by 1988. Halloran,
US Plans Big Spending Increasefor Military Operations in Space, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982,
at 60, col. 5.; see also Vilkin, Space Law, 2 CALIFORNIA LAWYER 32 (1982).
Most of the fifteen U.S. reconnaissance, electronic intelligence (ELINT), navigational,
ocean surveillance, and meteorological satellites orbit the earth at less than 600 miles (1,000
kilometers). Low-level satellites provide super-clear photographs of military maneuvers
around the world. As well as providing the U.S. with intelligence information, these satel-
lites are critical in determining the Soviet Union's adherence to arms limitation agreements.
In polar orbits, the United States has two weather satellites. Each circles the globe in twelve
hours, and is militarily important because it can, for example, be used to decide where pho-
tographic satellites should be positioned. Moreover, the Department of Defense has a sepa-
rate weather satellite system-the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) in
polar orbit. This system circles the earth every 101 minutes relaying complete weather data
within 20 minutes after passing overhead. The Department of Defense's Satellite Data Sys-
tem (SDS) is comprised of three satellites in polar orbit. This system contains the only U.S.
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these spacecraft.2 Other nations, collectively termed "Nth" coun-
tries, also have assets in earth orbit.3 These satellites have a multi-
tude of military and civil uses,4 including navigation, weather
communications satellites which are not in geosynchronous orbit. No satellites are reported
to be presently stationed in hypergeosynchronous orbit (beyond 22,300 nautical miles). Re-
portedly, however, new "VELA" satellites are to be stationed 60,000 miles out in space to
detect nuclear detonations through the use of heat sensors. Tsipis, U.S. - USSR Confrontation
or Cooperation in Space, in NINETEENTH STRATEGY FOR PEACE CONFERENCE REPORT 17
(1978) Bell, supra, at 7; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra, at 119; Halloran, supra; see also Wilford,
Military's Future in Space: A Matter of War or Peace, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1982, at C2, col.
3; Scoville, Problems of International Security in Outer Space, in EIGHTEENTH STRATEGY FOR
PEACE CONFERENCE REPORT 23 (1977).
2. Kahn, supra note 1. In contrast to the U.S., the USSR launches many more satel-
lites, although these satellites are shorter-lived. For example, in 1981 the Soviets launched
125 satellites to 16 launched by the U.S. However, some Soviet satellites "bum out" within a
six month period. Although some U.S. satellites also "burn out" in six months, many U.S.
satellites can operate for 10 years. While much less information is available about Soviet
military and defense activities, it is known that the USSR has invested much less in "C31r
satellites than has the U.S. Cf Halloran, supra note 1, at A60, col. 2. (Statement by former
Defense Secretary Harold Brown that "the Soviets, by virtue of their geographically central
position, have less need to rely on space-based systems .. "). Furthermore, the Soviet
Union's current space assets are largely in low-altitude orbit. Tsipis, supra note 1, at 19.
The USSR uses low-orbiting reconnaissance satellites, much as the U.S. does, to gather
intelligence information and verify U.S. adherence to arms limitation agreements. Addition-
ally, it has spacecraft aloft for the specific purpose of tracking warships. The Soviets also
have a three-system network of communications satellites. One of these systems is in low
orbit and consists of satellites launched in groups of eight. The two other systems are in
somewhat higher orbit. The Soviet Union thus has most of its communications satellites, as
well as three early warning satellites, in highly eccentric, low-dipping orbits. CARNEGIE RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 119, 133.
The USSR is, however, apparently increasing its use of geosychronous satellites. The
Soviets are also developing the "Glonass" system, which will eventually perform naviga-
tional tasks similar to those of NAVSTAR. Soviets Integrating Space in Strategic War Plan-
ning, 118 AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, March 14, 1983, at 110, 111. A new super
high frequency communications research spacecraft was launched in 1982. Reportedly, an-
other new Soviet communications spacecraft, designated "Potok," is planned for the same
orbital location. On March 13, 1983, the Soviets reportedly launched the "Ekran" television
relay satellite into geosynchronous orbit. Soviets Launch Winged Spacecraft, 118 AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, March 21, 1983, at 18.
3. See United Nations Committee on Disarmament, Report by the Committee, U.N.
Doc. CD/335 at Appendix III, Volume VII, Final Record of the One Hundred and Eighty-
Sixth Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. CD/PV. 186 at 9 (1982)(Statement of Mr. Saran of India)
[hereinafter cited as Disarmament Report]; see also Id. Final Record of the One Hundred
and Eighty-Fourth Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. CD/PV. 184 at 35 (1982) (statement of Mr.
Fields of the United States). India, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China have significant space assets in earth orbit. Any consideration of
anti-satellite weaponry must therefore take into account the interests of these nations. Tsipis,
supra note 1, at 18.
4. See generally Halloran, supra note 1. Though the USSR launches more satellites,
the U.S. is much much more dependent on satellites, especially for strategic "C3 1' use. Hal-
loran, supra note I (statement of General James V. Hartinger, head of the U.S. Space Com-
mand in Colorado Springs, that there is routine military reliance on satellites, partly for the
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forecasting, communications, intelligence, and mapping.'
The United States and the Soviet Union have been developing
their respective capacities to destroy each other's space assets for a
number of years.6 Currently, the USSR has an antisatellite
(ASAT) capability.' The United States originally planned to de-
velop its own ASAT by 1983, although to date it has not done so.8
command and control of the nation's far-flung military forces. "Over 70% of our long-haul
communications are handled by satellites."). We are Ahead by a Substantial Margin, 93 U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 22, 1982, at 43 (statement by NASA Administrator James M.
Beggs, on the numerosity of such launches as a sign of Soviet weakness: "their [Soviet]
satellites are less sophisticated than- ours and require replacement more often. They don't
have the life that ours do, and they are not multipurpose, as many of ours are. And so they
have to launch more in order to do a similar amount of work."). It is doubtful whether
adequate verification of arms control agreements would be feasible without reconnaissance
satellites. Cf Tsipis, supra note 1, at 18, 21-22.
Moreover, the U.S. and the USSR are increasing their commitments to the defensive
and military use of outer space. The U.S. in particular places a high value on its approxi-
mately forty satellites in "C31'' use. Many functions are consolidated for the U.S. in a small
number of satellites. Furthermore, the U.S. has a capacity substantially inferior to that of the
Soviet Union to replace its losses or augment its capability in a crisis situation. CARNEGIE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 119. The U.S. will continue to be significantly more dependent than
the USSR on space assets. This is particularly true if President Reagan follows through on
his stated intent to increase military exploitation of outer space, including an orbiting an-
tiballistic missile defense system. See Weisman, Reagan Proposes U.S. Seek New Way to
Block Missiles, N.Y. Times, March 24, 1983, at Al, col. 6. See Halloran, supra note I (state-
ment by Under-Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge that the Reagan Administra-
tion plans to increase military space spending by more than 10% each year; that in 1982 the
military space budget was 6.4 billion dollars; that the Administration plans to spend over 20
billion dollars more, mostly on space communications); see also Fact Sheet Outlining U.S.
Space Policy, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 872-76 (July 4, 1982).
5. Halloran, supra note 1, at Al, cols. 5, 6. The function of a satellite varies in part
according to the altitude at which the spacecraft orbits: E.g., see supra notes 1-2.
6. Hafner, Brobdignagian Skeet Shoot, 5 INT'L SECURITY 41, 44 (1981). At the present
time, the Soviet Union has the ability to destroy low-level U.S. reconnaissance and intelli-
gence satellites. The U.S. does not presently possess a similar capability, although it proba-
bly will by the late 1980's. Both nations are currently working on the use of directed energy
or laser weapons (DEWS) in space. Such weapons will be able to reach space targets in
geosynchronous orbit. The USSR is generally assumed to be significantly "ahead" of the
U.S. in laser research and development. Covault, Space Command Seeks ASA T Laser, 118
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, March 21, 1983, at 18, 19.
7. See infra note 20.
8. Hafner, supra note 6; cf. Butler-Hannifin, Unispace '82. Apprehension and Boredom,
S-I 1-227 SPACE WORLD 8, 12 (1982). The Reagan administration plans an even more ambi-
tious "C3I" role for geosynchronous spacecraft. MILSTAR will be a seven satellite defense
communications network. Initial operation is planned for 1987, with the system to be fully
operative in 1990. Halloran, supra note 1. Early warning satellites currently in use are re-
portedly to be replaced by improved mosaic "frog's eye" satellites that can track a moving
target and maintain surveillance simultaneously. Additionally SOFAR, an emergency
launch satellite system, will provide the U.S. with redundant sensing capabilities. Hotz, The
Real Star Wars, S-8-9-224-225 SPACE WORLD 10, 16 (1982).
Other Defense Department plans for space can be presumed from the estimated in-
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There are several types of weapons that are described in the
literature as either actual or potential ASATs. The co-orbital inter-
ceptor 9 is a satellite which moves into the same orbit as a target
satellite and then destroys it, usually by self-detonation.' ° The co-
planar interceptor is a satellite that orbits the earth in the same or-
bital plane as its target, eventually destroying the target when the
orbital paths intersect and the two satellites collide." A direct-as-
cent interceptor is a satellite launched from earth and aimed di-
rectly at a target, destroying it by impact or explosion.' 2 Lasers
and particle-beam weapons are two examples of what are collec-
tively termed directed energy weapons (DEWs). These weapons
can be ground- or space-based and have the potential to destroy in-
flight ballistic missiles and satellites.'3 A nuclear detonation, per-
haps at a distance of several thousand miles, 14 could also disable or
destroy a target satellite.' 5 Additionally, electronic interference or
an attack on satellite ground facilities 6 could currently be used to
disable satellites.
17
creases in spending on military uses of space. Under-Secretary of the Air Force Edward C.
Aldridge has described the U.S. intent to depend heavily on space as justified by the U.S.
need for force multipliers. Halloran, U.S. to Increase Military Funds/or Space Uses, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1982, at AI, col. 2.
In addition to the "C31", defense and other military uses of geosynchronous orbit, vari-
ous proposals also exist for commercial use of satellites at this altitude. For example, the
Heritage Foundation has suggested a solar powered satellite that would generate energy for a
space station. See David, The "High Frontier" Strategy, S-6-222 SPACE WORLD 22, 23 (June
1982). Professor Kosta Tsipis of M.I.T. warns however, that "[the] promise of new industrial
techniques and methods (for example, materials processing in a zero-g/high vacuum envi-
ronment) may encourage a much larger extension of the earth's economy into space." Tsipis,
supra note 1, at 13, 17.
9. Co-orbital interceptor ASATs are commonly referred to as "killer satellites." See
Hafner, supra note 6, at 44.
10. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 120 (also discussing the so-called "space mine,"
which is a co-orbital interceptor that is left dormant next to a target satellite for later use).
11. Id.
12. Id at 121.
13. See Boffey, Laser Weapons: Renewed Focus Raises Fears and Doubts, N.Y. Times,
March 9, 1982, at CI, col. 5.
14. See Manno, The Risks of Warfare in Space, 235 THE NATION 492, 493-5 (November
13, 1982) (discussing "Project Fishbowl," a 1962 U.S. nuclear test explosion at 250 miles
altitude that caused low-orbiting satellites thousands of miles away to malfunction. Eight
days after the explosion, Ariel I, a U.S.-U.K. research satellite was crippled; U.S. Air Force
spy satellites were also damaged. Ground radio telescopes malfunctioned, a new intense
radiation belt was formed, and a subsequent test planned at 500 miles altitude was
cancelled).
15. Id.; see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 121.
16. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note I, at 121.
17. Id. (noting that U.S. ground facilities are more vulnerable to attack than are Soviet
Vol. 14
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Antisatellite weapons pose a threat to United States, Soviet
and "Nth" Nation space assets. The development of such weap-
onry is generally destabilizing to international security.I8 Further-
more, the proliferation of ASATs may also violate international
law, which suggests an even stronger argument against their exist-
ence and development. This article will evaluate the legal status of
the current Soviet ASAT, the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV),
the Space Shuttle,' 9 DEWs, and the use of nuclear detonations for
the purpose of destroying satellites.
I. THE LEGALITY OF ASATs
The USSR has been overtly developing ASATs for over
twenty years. 20 The United States has also been developing its
ground facilities, apparently due to the fact that DSP relies on only a very few ground
stations).
18. The use of reconaissance satellites and other national technical means (NTM) by
the U.S. and the USSR is considered to add support to international stability. The existence
of these assets makes it impossible, in theory, for any nation to conceal its military maneu-
vers for any length of time. Antisatellite weapons, including current Soviet and planned U.S.
and USSR models, threaten the entire existing system of monitoring and verification pro-
vided by reconnaissance and early warning satellites, as well as strategic "C31.'' Jastrow, The
Lesson~of Soviet Space Exploration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1982, § VI, at 33, col. 1; cf. Arms
Control and Outer Space report of Canada to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament, U.N.
Doc. CD/320 at 12, 13 (26 August 1982) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Report].
19. The U.S. Space Shuttle, which orbits the earth at an altitude of several hundred
miles, is considered by the Eastern bloc to be an antisatellite weapon. The USSR in particu-
lar has protested the Shuttle as a plot by the "United States elite classes to place weaponry in
space." The U.S. has not denied the Shuttle's military potential, but has instead protested
that the USSR can easily protect against the Shuttle as an ASAT by attaching a charge to
each notential trgt -t w hich ...would detonate if the target was tamnpered with. Al-
though the Department of Defense has insisted that the Shuttle will not be used as an ASAT,
it might be used indirectly to support ASAT weaponry. For example, it can theoretically
place directed energy weapons in orbit; the first test of such a capability is slated for 1984.
Burt, Soviet Said to Ask Space Shuttle Halt, N.Y. Times, June I, 1979, at A6, col. 1; see also
Reed, Military Use of the Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON. L. REV. 665, 671-673 (1980). See Hotz,
supra note 8, at 10. Golden, Battlestar "Columbia'?, 117 TIME, April 27, 1981, at 20, 22; Bell,
supra note 1, at 7, 8. See also Committee, U.N. Doc. CD/335 at Appendix Ill/Volume VII,
Final Record of the One Hundred and Eighty-Sixth Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. CD/
PV.186 at Appendix Ill/Volume VII, Final Record of the One Hundred and Eighty-Fourth
Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. CD/PV.184 at 19 (1982) (statement of Mr. Erdembileg of
Mongolia).
20. The USSR began investigation of ASATs sometime about 1962. Bell, supra note 1,
at 9. In 1964, ASAT development began in earnest, as evidenced by the setting up of a
"PKO" unit. Hafner, supra note 6, at 46 n.5 (defining "PKO" or "Protivo-Kozmicheskaya
Oborona" literally as "anti-cosmic defense"). Testing of the co-orbital interceptor com-
menced in 1967. Tests continued in 1968 and 1969. In the early 1970's flight tests ceased and
apparently were not resumed again until 1976, when approximately four test launches oc-
curred. The Soviets observed a moratorium on ASAT tests from 1978 to 1980, the duration
5
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ASAT capabilities. 2 ASAT limitation talks were held in the late
1970's.22 These facts indicate that the United States and USSR do
of U.S.-USSR ASAT talks. Following the failure of those talks, the Soviets began tests again
in 1980. The current Soviet ASAT is a direct descendent of the early Soviet ASAT. Burt,
Russians Again Test a "Killer Satellite," N.Y. Times, April 19, 1980, at 28, col. 1; We are
Ahead by a Substantial Margin, 92 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 22, 1982, at 43;
Burt, U.S Seeks to Curb Killer Satellites, N.Y. Times, April 10, 1979, at 1, col. 4; cf. Smith,
Soviets Lag in Key Weapons Technology, 219 Sci. 1301, (March 18, 1983) (statement of
Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Richard DeLauer).
The Soviet ASAT is a satellite launched by an SS-9 ICBM launcher. This co-orbital
interceptor maneuvers close to its target and then explodes, throwing out shrapnel which
destroys the target satellite. Broad, .4 Fatal Flaw in the Concept of Space War, 215 Sci. 1372
(March 12, 1982) at 1372. But see CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 121 (classifying the
Soviet ASAT as a coplanar interceptor). Soviet ASAT tests have been successful. At least
one of these tests involved a Soviet target which moved into an orbit "similar" to that of U.S.
reconnaissance satellites. Cf. Weinraub, Soviet Antisatellite Test Reported, N.Y. Times, Oct.
28, 1977, at 4, col. 3.
The Soviet co-orbital interceptor apparently can currently reach only low-orbiting satel-
lites. Reports of the actual altitudes presently attainable range from 600 miles to 1,250 miles.
In addition, the ASAT reportedly has a quick-launch capability, and can destroy a target
during the target's first orbit with a small chance of U.S. surveillance. Hafner, supra note 6,
at 46 (noting that no capacity to intercept satellites in geosynchronous orbit has been demon-
strated). Hotz, supra note 8, at I1.
21. In 1958, U.S. ASAT research began with a grant by the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop a maneuverable co-orbital interceptor. Be-
tween 1959 and 1961, the Department of Defense, the Army and the Air Force experimented
with direct-ascent ASATs. By 1962, the original co-orbital program which eventually re-
sulted in the research and development stage of the United States Air Force Satellite Inter-
ceptor Program (SAINT) was cancelled. In 1964 the Air Force conducted ASAT tests on
Johnston Island in the Pacific. That project, which theoretically would have resulted in the
ability to conduct direct-ascent interception of orbiting Soviet bombers, was cancelled in the
early 1970's. Bell, supra note 1, at 9; Hafner, supra note 6, at 45-47. Cf. Butler-Hanninfin,
But Who Guards the Guardians, S- 11-227 SPACE WORLD 11 (1982) (reporting that SAINT
would have used nuclear warheads, and actually was tested).
Until the late 1970's, no further development of a U.S. ASAT was made public. How-
ever, in 1979, following the unsuccessful U.S.-USSR ASAT talks, the Carter Administration
began a new ASAT development program. The result of the Carter Administration's effort
was a non-nuclear direct-ascent interceptor called the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV),
which was slated to be tested in 1983. This ASAT will be launched from an F-15 plane by a
two-stage rocket, and will destroy its target on impact. Reportedly, the MHV will not be
fully operational until the late 1980's. The U.S. MHV will be unable to reach low-orbiting
satellites, that is, those orbiting up to an estimated altitude of 2,000 miles. However, it will
be able to reach the majority of Soviet reconnaissance and communications satellites, as well
as any orbiting Soviet space platform. Cf Soviets Integrating Space in Strategic War Plan-
ning, supra note 2, at 110; see e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 120, 121; Covault,
Space Command Seeks Asat Laser, 118 AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, March 21,
1983, at 18, 19.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 164-264. President Caner proposed ASAT nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union in March, 1977. Bilateral talks began in June 1978 in Hel-
sinki, moved to Berne in February 1979, and finally to Vienna in April 1979. Negotiations
were ended by Carter on December 24, 1979. Shortly following the breakdown of the ASAT
talks, the Soviets resumed testing their co-orbital interceptor. A self-imposed Soviet morato-
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not believe that ASATs violate the present regime of international
law.E3
International custom is one of the major sources of current in-
ternational law. The use of space, however, is a relatively recent
phenomenon and little customary international law has developed
in the area.24  As a result, positive law must be relied on as the
primary source of law for determining ASAT legality.25 The sev-
eral relevant treaties, agreements, and constitutions will therefore
be considered as sources of international law.
There have been various UN resolutions calling on nations not
to extend rivalries and arms into outer space.2 6 Most of these reso-
rium on testing had been in effect throughout the negotiating period. Hafner, supra note 6, at
42. But see CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note I, at 125 (stating that that by the time of the
Afghanistan crisis, ASAT negotiations had already been suspended to permit Carter to
devote his full attention to SALT II).
Very little information is available about these negotiations. Evidently, the U.S. desired
a halt on all ASAT testing, a dismantling of the Soviet system, and adequate verification.
The Soviets apparently wanted a one year ban on testing, an inclusion of the U.S. Space
Shuttle in negotiations, the protection only of U.S. and USSR space assets, and an exclusion
of protection for all satellites engaged in hostile activities. United States complaints about
the Soviet position included the fact that the U.S. wanted to protect all satellites in which the
other side "has an interest," in that way protecting the spacecraft of allies and NATO.
Goedhuis, Some Observations On the Efforts to Prevent a Military Escalation in Outer Space,
10 J. SPACE L. (1982), at 19. Further, the U.S. proposed protecting all kinds of spacecraft,
evidently including those engaged in hostile activities. Abandonment of the Space Shuttle
was not acceptable to the U.S. Vlasic, Disarmament Decade, Outer Space and International
Law, 26 McGILL L. J 135, 153 (1981); CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 125.
Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown is among those who believe that negotia-
tions aimed at banning space weaponry are urgently needed. In fact, most arms control
specialists outside the government consider the present the ideal time to reopen ASAT nego-
tiations. The stage of ASAT development is co.idered prime or limitation: Thc U.S.
ASAT has yet to be tested, and DEW ASATs are in the research and development stage.
Wilford, Military's Future in Space:. A Matter of War or Peace, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1982, at
C2, col. 6.
23. The Reagan Administration takes the position that the U.S. has an advantage in
space technology, which should be exploited through the development of ASATs. According
to this view, arms control is to be rejected due to the problems of verification and breakout,
and because any treaty will necessarily restrain U.S. flexibility in deploying its defenses. The
current Administration thus asserts that the development of ASATs is not prohibited. It
would, however, consider use of an antisatellite system against national technical means pro-
hibited. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 131; but see Compliance with Salt lAgreement,
Special Report No. 55, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs (July
1979).
24. Cf. Goedhuis, The Changing Legal Regime ofAir and Outer Space, 27 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 576 (1976).
25. ld
26. Eg., G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4009 (1958);
G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5571 (1963); G.A. Res.
1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5656 (1963); G.A. Res. 1963, 18
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lutions express the General Assembly's intent to avoid war in space,
and to develop space for peaceful purposes. 27 Recently, a resolu-
tion was passed specifically encouraging an ASAT limitation agree-
ment.28  While General Assembly resolutions do not impose any
legal obligation on UN members, 29 it is considered politically un-
wise for even dissenters to act contrary to a resolution's provisions.
Accordingly, these resolutions will also be taken into account.
A. Legality of Interceptors" ("Conventional" ASA Ts)
1. The Outer Space Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty3 was
signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United
Kingdom in 1967. Its purposes were threefold: (1) to provide for
the cooperation of parties exploring space, (2) to guarantee space as
the "common heritage of mankind," and (3) to prevent the arms
race from spreading to outer space.32 While the treaty does not
speak directly to the question of ASAT weapons, it does contain
several relevant provisions.
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states, "Outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies is not subject to na-
tional appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means or use of
occupation, or by any other means."'3 3 In a situation where a na-
tion with an interceptor ASAT weapon attempted to destroy all the
satellites of another nation, outer space would arguably be "appro-
priated," and Article II would be violated. Thus, such a use of in-
terceptors would be prohibited. In addition, Article IV, paragraph
1 of the Outer Space Treaty states that "Parties to the Treaty under-
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5656 (1963). See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 164-264.
27. Galloway, Space Law and Astronautics for Peace and Human Understanding, in 21
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE 178 (1979).
28. G.A. Res. 36/97 C, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/97 (1982) (Resolution passed December
9, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Western States' Resolution].
29. See infra notes 119-127 and accompanying text.
30. The Soviet ASAT is classified as a coorbital interceptor. There is also some
evidence that it can work as a coplanar interceptor. Cf. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at
121. The U.S. Space Shuttle, if deployed in an "ASAT mode," could function either as a
coorbital or coplanar interceptor.
31. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited
as Outer Space Treaty].
32. See Zedalis & Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,
8 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 454, 456-9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Zedalis & Wade].
33. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. II.
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take not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weap-
ons in outer space in any other manner.
3 4
Dispute over this provision commonly centers on whether or
not ASATs fall under the "nuclear weapons or . ..weapons of
mass destruction" rubric. An ASAT carrying a nuclear warhead
would violate Article IV, paragraph 1. To date, however, none of
the interceptor weapons use nuclear warheads.35 Whether or not
the Soviet ASAT, MHV, or Shuttle constitute "weapons of mass
destruction" is unclear since "mass destruction" is left undefined by
the Outer Space Treaty. It is generally thought, however, that
weapons employing conventional materials do not constitute
"weapons of mass destruction."36 Conversely, weapons employing
nonconventional components, such as nuclear, chemical, and bacte-
riological mechanisms would be classified as "weapons of mass de-
struction."37 Thus, the nature of the weapon, not its destructive
capacity, is the deciding factor in categorization.38
The U.S. MHV and Space Shuttle, as well as the Soviet ASAT,
use a conventional mechanism. Therefore, none of these weapons
appear to violate the letter of Article IV, paragraph 1, although
each may well violate its spirit.39 Paragraph 1 has consequently
been termed a "partial" disarmament of outer space.4° Article IV,
paragraph 2 of the Outer Space Treaty states:
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.
The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifica-
34. Id. art. IV, para. 1.
35. See supra note 21.
36. Outer Space Treaty. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Executive D, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, at 23, 76 (1967) (statement of Arthur Goldberg) [here-
inafter cited as Outer Space Treaty Hearingsl.
37. Id.; see also id. at 100 (statement of Cyrus Vance).
38. When a new weapon, not readily categorizable under this scheme, is developed, its
destructive capacity determines its classification. Thus if a new weapon's destructive impact
is of "catastrophic proportions," it will meet the "mass destruction" definition. For state-
ments of Goldberg and Vance defining "catastrophic proportions" as that magnitude of
harm done by a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon see S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE
LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 86 (1977) (stating that "catastrophic proportions"
have not been met if fewer than twenty or thirty people have been affected); Outer Space
Treaty Hearings, supra note 36, at 23 (statement of Arthur Goldberg).
39. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 32, at 459.
40. Markoff, Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provision in the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty 4 J. SPACE L. 3, 4 (1976).
1984
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tions, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of mili-
tary maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use
of military personnel for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equip-
ment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon
and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.4 1
Disputes over this treaty provision generally revolve around
the fact that the "peaceful purposes" clause omits any reference to
outer space. Apparently this omission was intended by the draft-
ers.42 The most generally accepted interpretation of this clause is
that the military use of outer space is not prohibited.43 Some schol-
ars have argued, however, that "peaceful purposes" applies to outer
space, notwithstanding the omission. They argue that the provi-
sions of any treaty must be interpreted together as a whole.",
Therefore, Article XIII's provision that "[tlhe provisions of this
"145
Treaty shall apply to the activities . . . in . . .outer space ....
must be construed together with Article IV, paragraph 2, thereby
making outer space usable only for peaceful purposes.4 6
Two major interpretations of "peaceful purposes" have won
support in the literature. The "nonaggressive" 47 approach, fol-
lowed by the United States, basically allows military personnel and
equipment in outer space.48  The Soviet Union also adopts the
"nonaggressive" approach, but does so only specifically in regard to
outer space.49 It adopts a "non-military" definition of "peaceful
purposes" with respect to the moon and other celestial bodies.50
Under the "non-military" interpretation, all military activity is or-
dinarily barred. l
Whichever interpretation of "peaceful purposes" is eventually
41. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV, Para. 2.
42. S. GOROVE, supra note 38, at 88.
43. Robinson, Militarization and the Outer Space Treaty--Time for a Restatement of
"Space Law," 16 ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS 28 (February 12, 1978).
44. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 32, at 477.
45. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. XIII.
46. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 32, at 477.
47. "Aggression" is usually defined as "the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the U.N.......GA. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
48. Outer Space Treaty Hearings, supra note 36, at 59 (statement by Senator Gore); cf. S.
GOROVE, supra note 38, at 90.
49. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 32, at 470 n.59.
50. Id.
51. The Legality ofAntisatefites, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467, 483 n.130. (1980).
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accepted, military personnel and equipment will be permitted for
research or other actual peaceful uses.52 Similarly, under both in-
terpretations, an aggressive attack by any ASAT, including the
MHV or Shuttle, would be prohibited.53 Furthermore, several au-
thorities argue that the mere presence of an ASAT in outer space is
itself aggressive. 54 If the argument that Article IV, paragraph 2 ap-
plies to outer space prevails, then at the very least, aggressive
ASAT activities will violate that clause.
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty reads:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting in-
ternational cooperation and understanding,
55
In a similar vein, Article I asserts: "Outer Space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and
use by all States in accordance with international law."56 In this
manner, Articles I and III explicitly make international law and the
provisions of the UN Charter57 applicable to outer space.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that "[a]ll Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations."58 An MHV, Shuttle, or Soviet interceptor at-
tack against the space assets of another nation would likely be pro-
hibited as a "use of force" under this Article.59 Article 51 of the
52. Id. at 483.
53. Id.; see Announcement of Administrative Review-United States Space Activities,
14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1135, 1136 (June 20, 1978) (statement of President Jimmy
Carter that "[tihe United States holds that the space systems of any nation are national prop-
erty and have the right of passage through and operations in space without interference.
Purposeful interference with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement upon sover-
eign rights").
54. Cf. 0. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 25, 32
(1975). But cf. HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1000 n.4 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as HENKIN].
55. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. III.
56. Id. art. I.
57. U.N. CHARTER 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force Oct 24,
1945).
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
59. Cf supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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UN Charter does, however, allow the use of force in self-defense.6"
Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union both subscribe to the
view that if one nation is attacked, and retaliates with an ASAT
attack in self-defense, then no violation of Article III occurs.
6 1
Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would currently
view anything less than an aggressive ASAT attack as a violation of
international law.62 Some scholars, however, have argued that the
mere existence of ASATs may be contrary to international legal
norms.
63
2. The Accident Measures Agreement and the Prevention of
Nuclear WarAgreement. At least one scholar has asserted that con-
ventional ASATs would be unlawful were they to interfere with the
early warning systems of the U.S. or USSR.6 4 This argument rests
on a combined reading of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce
the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War65 and the Agreement on the
Prevention of Nuclear War.66 United States early warning satel-
lites are for the most part in geosynchronous orbit.6 7 Therefore,
under this formulation, only the conventional Soviet ASAT with a
booster capable of placing it in geosynchronous orbit would be ille-
gal. The Soviet Union's early-warning satellites, however, do dip
into low orbits68 and therefore the conventional MHV or Shuttle
might be banned.
Article 3 of the Accident Measures Agreement states:
The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in
the event of detection by missile warning systems of unidentified
objects, or in the event of signs of interference with these systems
or with related communications facilities, if such occurrence
could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (stating, in relevant part, "[nlothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken meas-
ures necessary to maintain international peace and security .... ").
61. The Legality of Antisateiles, supra note 51, at 490 nn. 205-09.
62. Id. at 484; see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
64. Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 13, 14 (1982).
65. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, Sept. 30,
1971, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. NO. 7186, 807 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter cited as
Accident Measures Agreement].
66. Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, U.S.- U.S.S.R., 24
U.S.T. 1478, T.I.A.S. No. 7654 [hereinafter cited as Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement].
67. See supra note 1.
68. See supra note 2.
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Compliance with this provision clearly depends on the existence of
early warning systems. The Prevention of Nuclear War Agree-
ment, however, is not quite as direct in its reference to early warn-
ing. Article IV makes the following reference: "If at any time
relations between the Parties or between either Party and other
countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if rela-
tions between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to in-
volve the risk of nuclear war [then the Parties shall notify each
other] .. ."'0 The success of the latter article is thus dependent
on the existence of early warning systems; without such systems, the
risk of nuclear conflict would be apparent to neither party. Thus,
the United States and the Soviet Union are "oblige[d] . . . to re-
frain from interference with the . . . early-warning systems of
either side . . .,.
3. The NTM Provisions. Interceptor-type ASATs may violate
international law under the national technical means (NTM) provi-
sions first set out in Article XII, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems Treaty. 72 This provision states that "[flor the pur-
pose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty, each party shall use national technical means of verifi-
cation at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recog-
nized principles of international law."73 This provision reappears
69. Accident Measures Agreement, supra note 65, art. 3.
70. Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, supra note 66, art. IV.
71. Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 14. An operational Soviet ASAT has been tested to
altitudes of at most 1,250 nautical miles. All U.S. satellites orbiting the earth at less than
1,250 nautical miles are therefore potential targets. The U.S. Space Shuttle falls within this
range, as do many low-altitude reconnaissance and intelligence satellites. If USSR has, in
fact, developed a ground-based laser in an ASAT mode, such a laser would likely be effective
only against low-altitude U.S. targets. Either system, laser or interceptor, threatens the
United States ability to observe Soviet military maneuvers, thereby jeopardizing arms con-
trol verifiability. Gains by Soviet Reported in Test to Kill Satellites, N.Y. Times, March 19,
1981, at 1, col. 5.
Most U.S. communications, navigation and early warning satellites are in geosynchro-
nous orbit and are presumably safe from ASAT attack at the present time. If the Soviets are
successful in their development of a space-based laser ASAT, however, U.S. assets in geosyn-
chronous orbit will also be threatened. Similarly, if conventional Soviet ASATs are
launched by a huge new booster into geosynchronous orbit, U.S assets in that orbit will be
endangered. Either development would jeopardize NAVSTAR and early warning satellites,
as well as all "C3I" and other satellites launched into geosynchronous orbit. Presumably,
polar orbiting satellites would also be threatened. Id.
72. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Oct. 3, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R.., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty].
73. Id. art. XII, para. 1.
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in Article V of SALT 114 and in Article XV of SALT 1I.7
"National technical means" has not been defined. It has gen-
erally been said to refer, at a minimum, to reconnaissance and in-
telligence satellites.76 The continued appearance of the NTM term
is a tacit acknowledgment of the fact that photographic satellites,
ELINTS and the like are stabilizing forces that are crucial to the
verification of arms control pacts. Article VII, paragraph 2 of the
ABM Treaty provides that "[elach Party undertakes not to interfere
with the national technical means of verification of the other Party
operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article."77 It is
abundantly clear that paragraph 2, coupled with the same provi-
sions in SALT I and SALT II,78 bars either nation from interfering
with those satellites used in NTM.79 The NTM provisions, how-
ever, do not refer to non-reconnaissance satellites.8 ° Consequently,
only an attack on a reconnaissance satellite violates Article XII.
Moreover, if a party's satellite is not operating in accordance with
"international law,"'" that satellite could be attacked under Article
XII, paragraph 2.82
B. Legality of Space-Based DEWs
1. The Outer Space Treaty. Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty83 prohibits a nation from attempting to attain sovereignty
over outer space through the use of the MHV, Space Shuttle, ASAT
or other conventional interceptors. A fortiori, the use of lasers or
other DEWs as ASATs in outer space is similarly prohibited.84
74. Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strate-
gic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. V, 23 U.S.T. 3462 T.I.A.S. No. 7504
(entered into force Oct. 3, 1972) [hereinafter cited as SALT I).
75. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, SALTIlAgreement 21 (Selected Doc-
ument No. 12A, 1979) [hereinafter cited as SALT 1I].
76. Christol, Article Four of the 1967 Principles Treaty: Its Meaning and Prospectsfor its
Clarifcation, 21 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE 192, 199-200 (1979);
c. Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 15.
77. ABM Treaty, supra note 72, art. XII, para. 2.
78. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
79. Cf Scoville, Can Space Remain a Peaceful Environment 18 STANLEY FOUNDATION
OCCASIONAL PAPER 15 (1978).
80. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. SALT 11, supra note 75, art. XV, para. 2.
83. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. 2.
84. There is substantial doubt in the scientific community as to whether laser ASATs
can ever be physically operational. Tsipis, Laser Weapons, 245 Scl. AM. 51, 56-57 (Decem-
ber 1981); see also Boffey, supra note 13 (opinions of M.I.T. Professor Tsipis, IBM Physicist
Garwin, and Charles Townes, who shared the Nobel Prize for developing the laser). But cf.
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Under Article IV, paragraph 1, the orbiting or stationing of nuclear
weapons or weapons of mass destruction is prohibited.85 The test
of legality for lasers and DEWs thus becomes whether or not they
are nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.86
Although lasers and DEWs are not nuclear weapons, if a laser
or DEW has a "catastrophic impact" it will be banned from space
as a weapon of mass destruction. It is a generally accepted princi-
Robinson, Defense Dept. Backs Space Based Missile Defense, 117 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 27, 1982, at 15 (stating that Secretary of Defense Weinberger was told
by his advisors that the capability currently exists to build a laser capable of overcoming
Soviet targets). Nonetheless, the U.S. does have research underway, and huge sums of
money have already been expended on such study. Halloran, U.S Plans Weapon Against
Satellites, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, at 19, col. 1. No specific time for deployment of DEW
ASATs has yet been specified. Various estimates for lasers are as early as the mid 1980's, for
particle-beams, late 1980's, 1990's or perhaps never. Broad, A Fatal Flaw in the Concept of
Space War, 215 Sci. 1372 (March 12, 1982).
As early as 1979, it was reported that the Pentagon planned to develop a DEW, specifi-
cally, a satellite-mounted laser ASAT. Buckley, TV- Study of Real War in Space, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1979, § III, at 20, col. 4. The Reagan Administration has actively pursued
such a system, and has set forth a plan to develop space-based lasers. Covault, Space Com-
mand Seeks ASATLaser, 118 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, March 21, 1983, at
18, 19 (quoting U.S.A.F. General James V. Hartinger, head of the Space Command, who
said "laser ASAT is a technology that looks like it could possibly fulfill our requirements
better than the aircraft-launched ASAT [MHV] we are developing now"). The U.S. Air
Force has also recently drafted a statement of need for an ASAT laser. See also Robinson,
supra, at 14.
Like the U.S., the USSR is developing DEWs, especially laser weapons. The Soviets,
however, are devoting two to three times more resources to lasers than is the Pentagon. A
Soviet ground-based laser, with ASAT capability, has apparently already been developed.
The first demonstration of a Soviet space laser ASAT is expected by 1985. Burt, U.S. Says
Russians Develop Satellite Killing Laser, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1980, at 9, col. 1. See also
Wilson, Soviets Reported Ready to Orbit Laser Weapons, Washington Post, March 3, 1982, at
Ai, col. 6. Reports of estimated time to deployment in space vary from the mid-i980's to the
1990's. See Soviet Efforts Point to Antisatellite Laser, 118 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH-
NOLOGY 19 (March 21, 1983) (quoting the classified five-year military plan called "Fiscal
Year Defense Guidance 1984-1988": "The Soviets could launch the first protoype of a
space-based laser antisatellite system in the late 1980's or very early 1990's. An operational
system capable of attacking other satellites within a few thousand kilometers range could be
established in the early 1990's"); see also Hafner, supra note 6, at 42.
The USSR is also reportedly developing a large-capacity booster that could be used to
launch a laser ASAT system into space. This booster may also be used to launch conven-
tional ASATs into geosynchronous orbit. Should this development come to pass, the USSR
would have the capacity to intercept geosynchronous space targets. U.S. Vigilance Over So-
viet Space,4ctivities Increased, 117 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 53 (Oct. 4, 1982).
85. Id. art. IV, para. 1.
86. Id But see Zedalis & Wade, supra note 32, at 461-65 (setting out the argument of
some writers that nuclear and mass destruction weapons by themselves may orbit the earth;
they are only prohibited when stationed on a separate body which orbits the earth. Zedalis
& Wade respond that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27, May 22, 1969] precludes any such iterpretation).
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pie that lasers are in fact weapons of mass destruction. 8 Therefore,
Article IV, paragraph 1 plainly prohibits lasers from orbiting the
earth or from being stationed in outer space "in any other
manner."
88
The argument that space may be used only for non-aggressive
purposes carries much more weight in the area of laser ASAT
weaponry. The reason for this is that the mere presence of laser
weapons in outer space might well violate the non-aggression defi-
nition set out by the UN General Assembly.89 The extra force and
danger presented by a laser ASAT in space certainly warrants the
fear of greater aggression.
The application of international law to outer space in Articles I
and III prohibits the threat or use of force through laser ASATs just
as it prohibits the same threat through conventional ASATs.9 ° A
laser ASAT attack by one nation against the space assets of another
would be prohibited under Article III of the Outer Space Treaty9'
and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
9 2
Under the Outer Space Treaty, laser ASATs are clearly
banned from outer space because they are weapons of mass de-
struction under Article IV, paragraph 1. If such weapons were ac-
tually used, additional sections of the Treaty, as discussed above,
would also be infringed.
2. The Accident Measures Agreement and the Prevention of
Nuclear War Agreement. The Accident Measures Agreement and
the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement together obligate the
U.S. and USSR to refrain from interfering with each other's early
warning systems. This carries even more force in the area of laser
weapons, since laser ASATs will, in fact, be able to reach geosyn-
chronous orbit, where virtually all U.S. early warning satellites are
stationed.93 Similarly, laser ASATs would likely be able to reach
the Soviet early warning satellites in their present elliptical, low-
dipping orbits.94 The obligation not to intervene with such systems
87. S. GOROVE, supra note 38, at 87; Zedalis & Wade, supra note 32, at 465; see also
Comment, The Treaty on Outer Space. An Evaluation of the Arms Control Provisions, 7
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 274 (1968).
88. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV, para. I.
89. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
90. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, arts. I and III.
91. Id. art. 111.
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
93. See supra note 1.
94. See supra note 2.
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would be violated if laser ASATs were used to destroy early warn-
ing satellites.9"
3. The NTM Provisions. It has been suggested that the "na-
tional technical means" term of ABM, SALT I and SALT II would
preclude the United States or the Soviet Union from using conven-
tional ASATs to destroy reconnaissance satellites and the like.9 6 A
fortiori, laser ASATs, if used to attack reconnaissance satellites,
would also violate the NTM provisions.97
Laser ASATs more clearly violate the terms of positive inter-
national law than do conventional ASATs. Laser ASATs violate
the Outer Space Treaty merely by being deployed, regardless of
whether or not they are actually used against reconnaissance or
early warning satellites.98 When laser ASATs are used against
early warning satellites, they may implicitly violate the Accident
Measures Agreement and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agree-
ment.99 In addition, when laser ASATs are used against reconnais-
sance satellites, they will violate the national technical means
provisions. 1oo
C Legality of Laser ABMs
While the legality of conventional ASATs is questionable, an
even stronger case may be made against new systems presently
under consideration. For example, the Reagan Administration is
currently planning an ABM system that would consist of lasers
mounted on an orbiting space platform.' 0 ' Technologically, a sys-
tem built to knock out ballistic missiles can itself be used to destroy
satellites. The technologies of the two systems are similar, and one
system can be easily altered to perform functions of the other.'0 2
Therefore, a space-based laser ABM system would have at least
some antisatellite capability.
Article V of the ABM Treaty 0 3 states, in pertinent part, that
"[e]ach Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM sys-
tems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or
95. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
98. Cf. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV, para. 1.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
101. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
102. Id; see Canadian Report, supra note 18 at 11-13.
103. ABM Treaty, supra note 72.
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mobile land-based."'" Therefore, the planned Reagan space-
based laser ABM system is presumptively illegal. Furthermore, it
could be used as an ASAT. This possible use bars it from outer
space under Article IV, paragraph 1 of the Outer Space Treaty.'
0 5
If in the alternative the Administration designates this weapon as a
laser ASAT, it could be used to counter ballistic missiles, and in
that mode would violate Article V of the ABM Treaty.106
D. Legality of Ground-Based and Air-Based Laser ASA Ts
Weapons of this type do not orbit the earth and are not sta-
tioned in outer space. Accordingly they do not violate Article IV,
paragraph 1 of the Outer Space Treaty.'0 7 If, however, these weap-
ons are used either aggressively or in an attempt to appropriate
outer space, then Article IV, paragraph 2 and Article II would be
violated. 1°8 Moreover, Article III of the treaty and Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter ban the use of these ASATs against another coun-
try's space assets unless used defensively under Article 51 of the
UN Charter. 09
Laser ASATs violate the Accident Measures Agreement and
the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement if they are used to inter-
vene with early warning satellites." 0 The NTM provisions simi-
larly bar ground and air-based ASATs from attacking
reconnaissance satellites." '
Article V(1) of the ABM Treaty specifically makes air-based
ABM systems illegal. 1 2 Therefore, the development, testing, or use
of an air-based laser ASAT, if technologically interchangeable with
an air-based ABM system, would violate the ABM Treaty.' "'
E. Legality of Nuclear Explosions
The United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other na-
tions, have the current capability to use a nuclear explosion in outer
104. Id. art. V, para. I (emphasis added).
105. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV, para. 1.
106. ABM Treaty, supra note 72, art. V, para. 1.
107. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV, para. 1.
108. Id. art. II and art. IV, para. 2.
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
110. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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space to destroy satellites." 4 However, in 1963 the United States
and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Test
Ban Treaty)." 5 Article 1 of the Test Ban Treaty states:
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit,
to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear test explosion, or
any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or
control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer
space, or under water, including territorial waters or high seas
116
This provision clearly prohibits nuclear tests in outer space. The
United States and the Soviet Union are thereby prohibited from
using nuclear explosives to destroy satellites.
F Legality of Other ASA Ts
It should be noted that there are in existence today a multitude
of weapons, primarily designed for some other purpose, which can
be used against satellites.' l' For example, a satellite can be "peace-
fully" launched and not be activated until needed to intervene with
another satellite. Ground-based lasers used in scientific research
could be switched into an "ASAT mode" and used to destroy a
space target." 1
8
None of these mechanisms necessarily violate international
law until deployment in an ASAT mode. Nevertheless, they pro-
vide a stumbling block to those who view verification as absolutely
crucial to arms control.' 19
G. The Legal Effect of Positive Law
Assuming that the ASATs described above violate the UN
Resolutions, UN Charter, and the various treaties set forth above,
the crucial issue to be determined is the enforceability of those pro-
114. Boffey, supra note I (reporting the Congressional Research Service's assertion that
"a single nuclear warhead could conceivably disable all satellites," including those in ge-
osynchronous orbit, leaving unharmed only those satellites protected by the earth's shadow.)
115. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
cited as Test Ban Treaty].
116. Id. art. I (emphasis added).
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visions. This section will discuss the effect of this presumed illegal-
ity on the continued existence of ASATs.
1. UNResolutions. "Even those who are the most opposed to
attributing any direct legislative effect to General Assembly resolu-
tions will usually concede that they are capable, like many other
things, of contributing to the lex communis."' 2° In that sense, Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions constitute material that influence the
content of law, although they do not create it. Nevertheless, "virtu-
ally, all governments have affirmed the general line that [UN] Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions are not legally binding per se." 121 On
other hand, even States adhering to the formulation that UN reso-
lutions are "non-legally binding" have asserted that declarations
and resolutions may express international law in specific cases.
122
Resolutions are thereby relied upon to resolve actual disputes.
123
Therefore, despite the lack of reference to UN resolutions in Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 124 legal effect
may be given to the collective pronouncements of the General As-
sembly and of international conferences.
125
Although some assert that resolutions are merely political, at
least one well known scholar claims that actions of the United Na-
tions do in fact have legal significance. 26 Professor Oscar Schacter
suggests that the value of a resolution or declaration as evidence of
customary international law depends on whether the provisions of
the resolution or declaration are followed in actual practice.
127
The various acts of the United Nations General Assembly are
probably best viewed as evidence of customary international law.
However, should an antisatellite case actually be brought before the
International Court of Justice, the I.C.J. could conceivably give le-
gal effect to the UN's resolutions and declarations.
128
120. Fitzmaurice, Special Report to the lnstitut de Droit International, 1973 LIVRE DU
CENTENAIRE 1873-1973 269, quoted in HENKIN, supra note 54, at 103 n.5.
121. Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1, 4 (1976).
122. See generally Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 1974 1.C.J. 24; Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J.
16.
123. Id
124. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bev-
ans 1179.
125. Schachter, supra note 121, at 5.
126. See id, at 4-7.
127. Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300, 311-
19 (1968).
128. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
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2. Agreements. Among the relevant provisions in this area
are the Accident Measures Agreement, the Prevention of Nuclear
War Agreement, 129 and the NTM provisions of SALT I and SALT
11.1 30 There is some dispute as to whether agreements have, or
ought to have, the same legal significance as treaties.131 Under do-
mestic law, if an agreement is signed by the President and then
accepted by two-thirds of the joint Congress, it is a complete alter-
native to a treaty. 32 Under international law, agreements carry
virtually the same obligations as do treaties. 33 There is, however,
some dispute as to the constitutionality under U.S. law of such
agreements. 134
3. Treaties. In regard to non-disarmament treaties, the Inter-
national Law Commission has restated the rule that a material
breach of a multilateral treaty will allow any party to the treaty
"specially affected by the breach" to "invoke it [the breach] as a
ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in
part in the relations between itself and the defaulting state."' 35 A
material breach of a bilateral treaty by one party "entitles the other
to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or sus-
pending its operation in whole or in part."' 36 If the "other" party
contests the breach, under the UN Charter and under general inter-
national law the parties are obligated to seek a solution of their
dispute through peaceful means. "M The underlying principle of
these rules is that no State can be called upon to meet its treaty
obligations when another party to that treaty fails to fulfill obliga-
tions thereunder. Nevertheless, this inherent right to terminate or
suspend is "without prejudice to the injured party's right to present
an international claim for reparation on the basis of the other
party's responsibility with respect to the breach."'
' 38
129. See supra notes 65-66.
130. It is not critical to the analysis undertaken herein that SALT I is no longer in effect
and SALT II never was in effect. The relevant "NTM" provisions in SALT I and II are also
set out in the ABM Treaty, which is in effect. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
131. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 173-76 (1972).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 184-86.
134. Id. Any detailed discussion of this dispute is beyond the scope of this work.
135. See generally Int'l Law Commission Report, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1 169-227
(1966) (construing art. 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23,
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Disarmament treaties are governed by a different rubric.
Whether multilateral or bilateral, a "breach [of a disarmament
treaty] by one party tends to undermine the whole regime of the
treaty as between all the parties."' 39 International law therefore
provides that, in order to protect any one State from the threats of
another State, "any party must be permitted without first obtaining
the agreement of the other parties to suspend the operation of the
treaty with respect to itself generally in its relations with all the
other parties."'
' 40
It is clear that a nation can escape its obligations under an
arms control treaty by the breach of another party. Similarly, inter-
national law does not provide for the specific performance of trea-
ties. Any such notion would be diametrically opposed to the idea
of state sovereignty.14 1 However, the rule of pacta sunt servanda
142
does apply in the international law context. 143 Furthermore, Arti-
cle 2(2) of the UN Charter states that, "[aill Members . . . shall
fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.'" 44 In an actual case, however, it is
hardly likely that the U.S. or USSR would attempt to enforce its
rights judicially. If abrogation was in a nation's best interests, such
abrogation would almost certainly occur before the I.C.J., for ex-
ample, became involved.
The various treaties and agreements to which the U.S. and
USSR are parties all impose obligations that theoretically must be
followed under penalty of appropriate sanctions. 45 Yet under Ar-
ticle 60 of the Vienna Convention, a State can essentially abrogate
an arms control treaty at its initial "material breach."' 146 Therefore,
if the contingencies discussed above occur, and the current arms
control treaties and agreements discussed above are violated, the
most likely result will be abrogation.
4. Withdrawal Clauses. Certain similar provisions, referred
to herein as "withdrawal clauses," recur in the Test Ban, Outer
Space and ABM treaties. The Test Ban Treaty, 147 in Article 4,
139. Id
140. Id
141. See CHAYES, EHRLICH & LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 997
(1969).
142. Literally, agreements of the parties must be observed at all costs.
143. See MCNAIR, LAw OF TREATIES 493 (1969).
144. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2.
145. Id.
146. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 135, at art. 60.
147. Test Ban Treaty, supra note 115.
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gives each party the right to withdraw if "it decides that extraordi-
nary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeop-
ardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice to
all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance. '  Simi-
larly, Article XVI of the Outer Space Treaty 49 provides that: "Any
State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the
Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to
the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect
one year from the date of receipt of this notification."'150 Article
XV(2) of the ABM Treaty' 5 ' resurrects the language of the Test
Ban Treaty, stating that each party has a right to withdraw ". . . if
it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."'' 52 Hence, a na-
tion wishing to be freed of its obligations under an arms control
agreement need not breach the ABM, Outer Space, or Test Ban
Treaties. Instead, such a nation could choose the more acceptable
option of exercising a withdrawal clause.
5. Consultation Provisions and Treaty Interpretations. It has
been demonstrated above that it is not particularly difficult for a
party to an arms control treaty to abrogate its responsibilities there-
under if it so chooses. The relevant literature frequently empha-
sizes ways to avoid one's disarmament or arms limitation
obligations.'53 Law review articles as well as industry journals in-
terpret the Outer Space Treaty as narrowly as possible, allowing the
development of ASATs if at all possible. 154 Indeed, there is a wide-
spread tendency to read the current treaties, which are worded to
prohibit specific activities, as implying that "everything that is not
prohibited is allowed."' i5 5 As new technologies are developed, such
advances will necessarily be permissible under these interpretations
of the relevant law. "Technological advances in this way tend to
undermine arms control treaties."'
' 56
One might reverse this trend by interpreting the relevant trea-
ties in a way that enforces their consultative language. Each treaty
148. Id. at art. 4.
149. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. XVI.
150. Id
151. ABM Treaty, supra note 72, art. XV, para. 2.
152. Id.
153. Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 25.
154. Eg., Zedalis and Wade, supra note 32.
155. Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 25.
156. Id.
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and agreement discussed appears to have been drafted to take ac-
count of future contingencies. 157 For example, the Outer Space
Treaty provides for "international" consultations concerning activi-
ties that might harmfully interfere with the activities of party
States. 158 Likewise, the ABM Treaty expands on this idea by set-
ting up the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to consider
questions, settle disputes, discuss amendments, and the like.
159
SALT I and SALT II similarly make provision for the SCC mecha-
nism. 160  Other agreements also provide for consultation.' 6 ' For
example, the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement states that in
cases of danger, the U.S. and USSR "shall immediately enter into
urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert
this risk."' 62 The consultation provisions, if literally read, place a
positive obligation on nations.1 63  Assuming that nations have
agreed to the various arms control provisions because they enhance
stability, then perhaps more public pressure ought to be brought to
bear on enforcing these consultation clauses.'
64
II. SUGGESTIONS
A. Scholarly Thought on Delimiting ASA Ts
Space law scholars are in accord that "further positive law is
required to limit ASAT development and deployment."' 65 This
section will discuss some of the major proposals under
consideration. 1
66
1. Carl Christol Professor Christol would revise Article
157. See supra notes 20-116 and accompanying text.
158. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IX.
159. ABM Treaty, supra note 72, art. XIII.
160. SALT I, supra note 74, art. VI; SALT II, supra note 75, art. XVII.
161. Eg., Accident Measures Agreement, supra note 65, art. 7.
162. Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, supra note 66, art. IV.
163. For example, the word "shall" is used to impose a duty.
164. See infra notes 165-264 and accompanying text.
165. The Legality of Antisatelites, supra note 51, at 492.
166. See also, Zedalis and Wade, supra note 32; Vlasic, supra note 22; Perry, Advanced
Technology and Arms Control, 26 ORBIs 351 (1982) (from an edited revision of a paper
presented at the 2nd Annual Conference on Security and Arms Control held outside Moscow
in December, 198 1); Almond, Military Activities in Outer Space--the Emerging Law, 23 COL-
LOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 149 (1982); Address by Albert Carnesale, Interdisci-
plinary Conference at Harvard Law School: Law and Lawyers in Arms Control and
Peacemaking (Feb. 1I, 1983); Wilford, Military's Future in Space. A Matter of War or Peace,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1982, at C2, col. 6.; Remarks by John Steinbruner, The Future of Strate-
gic Arms Control in the Wake of Salt I, 34 AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 212, 216-17 (1981);
Garthoff, Banning the Bomb in Outer Space, 5 INT'L SECURITY 25, 39 (Winter 80/81).
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Paragraph one should be extended to cover conventional weap-
ons. It is no longer acceptable to limit the scope of this para-
graph to nuclear or mass destruction-type weapons. If there were
any doubt whether an ASAT is a conventional weapon, it would
be desirable to provide specifically that ASATs may not be
launched into, tested in, or used in the space environment.
6 8
This revision would effectively eliminate conventional ASATs from
outer space. Christol would go on to provide for the most stringent
verification procedures. To accomplish that end, he would amend
Article IV, paragraph 2169 so that it would state that "space objects
be equipped with docking facilities meeting a common interna-
tional standard so that inspections could be accomplished by non-
national including multi-national, inspecting satellites."' 70
Christol argues that the policy reason motivating the Outer
Space Treaty, that is, a fear of "Bombs in Orbit,"'' is not suited to
the 1980's. He contends that States are no longer as worried about
the possibility of nuclear bombs in outer space 172 as they are about
the need to extend some sort of Article IV protection to conven-
tional weapons.' 73 He concludes that "[a] new arms race in the
space environment would be destabilizing," and that, as Article IV
is currently inadequate to deal with the testing, deployment, or use
of an interceptor satellite, revisions must be made.
74
2. Herbert Scoville. Scoville recommends a bilateral agree-
ment between the Soviet Union and the United States. 75 Such an
agreement would, at a minimum, ban the use of ASATs, but prefer-
ably would also ban testing and deployment. An immediate goal
would be to "put a ceiling on current space weapons, as well as
attempting to restrict the development of new weapons systems in
outer space."' 176 A forum modeled on the ABM Treaty's Standing
Consultative Commission 77 would be used to discuss problems as
167. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV.
168. Christol, supra note 76, at 203.
169. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV, para. 2.
170. Christol, supra note 76, at 203.
171. Id. at 206 n.53.
172. Such bombs are presumably banned from outer space under the terms of the 1963
Test Ban Treaty. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
173. Christol, supra note 76, at 206.
174. Id.
175. Scoville, supra note 79, at 18-20.
176. Id. at 22.
177. ABM Treaty, supra note 72, art. XIII.
25
Fern: Antisatellite Weapons and the Question of Negotiated Arms Limitat
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
they arose. Additionally, Scoville would proscribe all space weap-
ons systems, since a simple prohibition on ASATs might encourage
States to deploy other types of weaponry.' 78
3. Goedhuis. Professor Goedhuis suggests, preliminarily, that
in the context of Article IV(2) 79 of the Outer Space Treaty, the
term "weapons of mass destruction" ought to be defined so that it is
clear whether or not ASATs and lasers are prohibited. 180 He also
suggests defining the term "peaceful purposes" in Article IV(2)."'8
Goedhuis approves of the UN Committee on Disarmament's cur-
rent ASAT negotiations. 18 2 Furthermore, he believes that "a re-
sumption of the bilateral talks between the United States and the
Soviet Union on banning anti-satellite weapons would be appropri-
ate as a complimentary negotiation to the discussion in the Com-
mittee on Disarmament."'' 83 However, he approvingly quotes
Barry Blechman, who says that:
there has been a tendency to seek U.S.-Soviet agreement as a
first step, believing that once that nut has been cracked, wider
agreements would follow. This has not only placed undue bur-
dens on U.S.-Soviet relations, but has nurtured the fears of
those who see arms control as an expression of the U.S.-Soviet
Condominium thereby aggravating the political problems al-
ready surrounding the negotiations.'
8 4
Goedhuis believes that lasers and other directed energy weap-
ons should be top priorities of the Committee on Disarmament.'85
He suggests that all nations take a new approach to the interpreta-
tion of treaties. Under Goedhuis' new approach, treaties would be
formulated in such a way that only certain named activities would
be allowed; everything else would be prohibited.'86 Goedhuis rec-
ognizes the importance of world politics in the achievement of any
ASAT agreement.' 87 He further suggests that it is supremely im-
portant to "create and arouse" world public opinion on this
178. Scoville, supra note 79, at 22.
179. Professor Goedhuis probably meant Art. IV(I).
180. Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 18.
181. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, art. IV, para. 2.
182. See infra notes 229-246 and accompanying text.
183. Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 23.
184. Blechman, Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a FutureZ 59 FOREIGN AFF. 102,
124 (Fall, 1980).
185. Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 25.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 26.
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4. Hafner.89 Ideally Hafner would require the Soviets to
dismantle their current ASAT system. He would also accept an ac-
cord without such dismantlement.' 90 Any agreement actually ne-
gotiated would work via one of two main approaches. First, one
could define in detail what an ASAT weapon consists of, and there-
after ban all such weapons.' 9' Alternatively, one could ban the
testing, deployment, or use of any weapon in a manner appropriate
for attacking satellites. 92 Hafner feels that the first approach of
"banning things" has several inherent problems. Banning individ-
ual weapons will often provide a blueprint of the way to circumvent
the intent of the treaty, while staying literally within its letter.
Moreover, many component parts of ASATs will be present in non-
threatening spacecraft.
93
Hafner prefers a treaty banning all ASAT activities. 94 Such a
treaty would be modeled on the ABM Treaty. It would include
these provisions: (1) each side would agree not to use, deploy, or
test any weapon or system for damaging or destroying satellites;
and (2) each side would agree not to interfere with the functioning
of the other's satellites. 95 Hafner's proposal would stop the growth
of offensive ASAT technology, but allow defensive measures for
protecting satellites.' 96 Such an accord would prevent the testing of
ASATs at higher altitudes. Hafner fears an "unbridled" ASAT
competition, with the Soviets acquiring an improved capability
even as the U.S. places greater reliance on space assets.' 97
Hafner believes that his agreement would be verifiable by cur-
rentlv existing intelligence and surveillance facilities. 19' He is un-
188. Id.
189. L. Donald Hafner was an advisor to the SALT delegation in Geneva and an analyst
with the NSC ASAT Working Group involved in the 1978-79 U.S.-U.S.S.R.. ASAT talks.
190. Hafner, supra note 6, at 57.
191. Id. at 54 ("banning things").
192. Id. ("banning actions").




197. Id at 60.
198. Id. at 57 (specifically making reference to the Space Detection and Tracking System
(SPADATS) which detects, classifies, and maintains a file of all space objects; and to the
GEODDS high altitude tracking system that will monitor objects as small as 1 foot in diame-
ter at a distance of up to 23,000 nautical miles).
315
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concerned about the verification problem that troubles so many
others. Hafner explains that:
any ASAT system would expose itself at many points to detec-
tion: e.g., direct-ascent, co-orbital, and space-based laser in-
terceptors would require launch preparations, launching, and
maneuvering to altitudes and orbital planes appropriate for
ASAT attacks; ground or space-based lasers or charged particle
weapons [DEWs] would involve the rapid discharge of high
levels of energy and possible waste products of power genera-
tion; in all cases the damage, intense heating, destruction, or dis-
placement from its orbit of a target could be detectable. 99
Hafner's only real verification concern2"' is the fact that the
current Soviet ASAT uses components of other Soviet weapons,
and is similar to other Soviet space missions. He believes, however,
that this concern can be alleviated through satellite hardening
measures and by dismantlement of the current Soviet ASAT.2° '
According to Hafner, the United States "loses nothing by continu-
ing to explore Soviet interest in ASAT constraints along the lines
sketched here. 20 2
5. Carnegie Institute. The Carnegie Institute suggests that the
United States has more to gain from its own use of space than from
denying the Soviets their use of it. 20 3 Therefore, the Institute would
at least investigate the use of arms control agreements to protect the
United States' sizeable military and economic investment in its as-
sets. 2°4 The Institute pessimistically focuses, however, on the defi-
ciencies that would inhere to any ASAT agreement. It postulates
that even with such an agreement, one could not fully protect satel-
lites from attacks by nuclear blast, electronic interference or attacks
on "C3I" ground facilities.2 5 The Institute also discusses the tradi-
tional worries in arms control agreements: verification, circumven-
tion, and breakout.20 6 Nevertheless, four areas are identified as
199. Id.
200. Id. at 59 (noting that ASAT research and development would be allowed because
the verification problem at the laboratory level is virtually insurmountable).
201. Id.
202. Id (stating further that during the 1978-79 ASAT negotiations, the Soviets showed
every intention of taking the ASAT issue seriously, including the appointment of space law
authority Oleg Khlestov as head of their ASAT delegation and the observance of a morato-
rium on testing ASATs throughout the talks).
203. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 131.
204. Id.
205. Id at 130.
206. Id at 131.
Vol. 14
28
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss2/3
ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS
potentially ripe for a negotiated ASAT agreement.
First, a ban is hypothesized on all testing of ASAT interceptors
beyond the current low-altitude range. 207 This measure would, in
effect, allow the current Soviet ASAT and the planned U.S. MHV.
It would theoretically not allow the launching of the current Soviet
ASAT into higher altitudes with a stronger booster. This ban
would not extend to DEWs or other non-interceptor type ASATs.
The Carnegie Institute cautions against any more comprehensive
ban on the theory that any such ban would be too hard to verify.2 °8
Second, a separate ban is suggested as to all space-basing of lasers
and particle-beam generators 219 The ban could be extended to
ground-based laser ASATs. This solution would protect the United
States' high-altitude satellites. Further, since DEW ASATs are still
only in the research stage, a ban should be easier to achieve. 210 The
Carnegie Institute again cautions that verification problems would
exist for ground-based lasers and particle-beam weapons because
the configurations of ASAT, DEWs and peacefully-used DEWs are
highly similar.21 Third, an arms control agreement could restrict
the position of countries' satellites.2" 2 This would reduce the fear of
"space mines." Furthermore, early-warning would be improved
since the violation of any rule would be apparent in a crisis. 213 Fi-
nally, the Carnegie Institute suggests that an attack on another
country's satellite could be defined as an act of war,21 4 or an act of
aggression contrary to the UN Charter.1 5
The Carnegie Institute's proposals are based on the proposi-
tion that ASAT limitation will result in some improvement in the
informational part of U.S. "C31", and hence offer some stabiliza-
tion.2 1 6 Additionally, any ASAT agreement wil enhance early
warning by forcing a nation to violate an arms control provision
before attacking a spacecraft.2 7 The Carnegie Institute is primarily
concerned with protecting high altitude U.S. satellites. These pro-





212. Rules to restrict satellite position are known as "parking rules."
213. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 123.
214. Id.
215. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
216. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 125.
217. Id. at 124.
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posals would raise U.S. confidence in the survivability of its ge-
osynchronous spacecraft, but leave low-level assets insecure.
6. Tsipis. A Discussion Group of the Stanley Foundation led
by Professor Tsipis has agreed that the Soviet ASAT is destabi-
lizing, and that the increasing militarization of space is contrary to
the United States' best interests.2 IR The group thought that "the
threat of space conflict could impede the development of the most
promising civil applications of space and poses substantial risk to
current and anticipated (and costly) U.S. space programs, such as
the Space Shuttle."2 9
The Group declared negotiations of bilateral and multilateral
treaties as "most important" to limit or prohibit ASATs.22" The
proposed treaty would provide for new international organs for
arms control in space and verification. 22 1 All nations "concerned"
would be included in discussions. Joint ownership and manage-
ment was suggested to ascertain that civil programs were not being
modified for military objectives.22 2 The treaty would focus on test-
ing restrictions. 223 A ceiling would be placed on current weapons
and new weapons would be restricted.224 A nonuse treaty was con-
sidered worthless, because testing and deployment would be
permitted.225
Tsipis' group noted the difficulties inherent in verifying devices
that can be used both hostilely and peacefully. 226 Nonetheless, the
group still postulated an agreement. The agreement does not de-
pend on certain verification, but rather on consultation.227 Ambi-
guities about space activities, and any other pertinent issues, are to
be resolved through an organ modeled on the ABM Treaty's Stand-
ing Consultative Commission.228
B. Views Expressed in the United Nations
1. Resolution of the UN Special Session on Disarmament. The
218. Tsipis, supra note 1, at 19.
219. Id.






226. Id at 16 (citing the Soviet Salyut and U.S. Space Shuttle as examples of such
devices).
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UN General Assembly, in its Special Session devoted to disarma-
ment, adopted the following resolution:
In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures
should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held,
in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.229
In so doing, the view that further positive law is needed to make
ASATs illegal was vindicated.23 ° The UN General Assembly's res-
olution demonstrated its position that current international law is
inadequate to guarantee peace in space.
2. France's Proposal. Also proposed at the Special Session
was the French delegation's idea for an International Satellite
Monitoring Agency (ISMA) devoted to the improved verification of
arms control agreements.2 3 ISMA would theoretically use Soviet
and American technology to benefit the world as a whole.
23 2
"Through the collection of information and through the verifica-
tion process, the world community [would apply] one of the most
effective sanctions available in international law: international
public censure.
23 3
France thus aspired to solve the verification problem that is
given so much weight in argument against arms control agree-
ments. The success of any such proposal is, however, doubtful at
present, in part because the U.S. and USSR are against it and be-
cause the nations that favor such a proposal are themselves uncer-
tain as to exactly what is needed to solve the verification
problem.234
. ta1, Pronosal Further measures were suggested by Italy
through a proposed new protocol to the Outer Space Treaty, intro-
duced in the Committee on Disarmament.235 In relevant part, the
proposal prohibits the "launching into earth orbit or beyond of ob-
229. S-10 U.N. GAOR Annex 12 (Agenda Item 12) at 552, U.N. Doc. A/S-10/23 (1978)
(Recommendations of Ad hoc Committee of 10th Special Session, Final Document of Tenth
Special Session of U.N. General Assembly).
230. Id.
231. U.N. Doc. A/S-10/PV. 3 (May 25, 1978) (French proposal at 10th Special Session
on Disarmament); see U.N. Doc. A/S-10/AC.I/7 (June 1, 1978).
232. See Jakhu & Trecroce, Int'l Satellite Monitoringfor Disarmament and Development,
5 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 509, 512 (1980).
233. Id. at 513.
234. See Lay, Recent Developments in Space Law, 9 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 514, 516 (1979).
235. U.N. Doc. CD/9 (1979) (Proposal by Italian delegation to Committee on
Disarmament)
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jects carrying weapons of mass destruction or any other types of
devices designed for offensive purposes, the conduct of military ma-
neuvers as well as the testing of any type of weapons. '"236 In expla-
nation, Mr. LaRocca, the Italian delegate, stressed the importance
of reconnaissance, surveillance, and communications satellites to
stability and verification.237 Although the Italian proposal did not
speak specifically to ASATs, the test ban on "any type of weapons"
presumably would cover ASATs.
4. Soviet Draft Treaty. On August 10, 1981, Foreign Minister
Gromyko sent a Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing
of Weapons of any Kind in Outer Space238 to the UN Problems
with the draft were identified by the 34th UN General Assembly.
For example, in Article 1(1), only space-based ASATs are banned;
nothing is explicitly said about ground-based weapons. The treaty
only operates prospectively; nothing at all is said about dismantling
current ASATs. Next, the draft provides for verification by na-
tional technical means.239 Most States, except for the U.S. and
USSR, prefer an ISMA arrangement. The U.S. and USSR prefer
NTM*
240
If ASATs are defined as "weapons" by the Soviet Draft, they
will be prohibited from space. Otherwise, the Soviet Draft leaves
open many of the Outer Space Treaty's loopholes, allowing a na-
tion which wants ASATs to easily avoid the letter of the treaty.
Furthermore, ground-based ASATs are not banned at all.
5. Western States' Resolution. The Western nations' dissatis-
faction with the Soviet Draft led to the passage of a resolution enti-
tled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space."24' This
resolution passed unanimously, with only the Soviet bloc countries
abstaining. The Western States' Resolution specifically urged the
Committee on Disarmament 242 to negotiate an "effective and verifi-
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. See Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 20 (statement of Mr. LaRocca).
238. Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer
Space, U.N. Doc. A/36/192 (August 10, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Soviet Draft]. For a good
survey of Soviet legal views, see Comment, Military Activities in Outer Space.- Soviet Legal
Views, 25 HARVARD I.L.J. 153 (1984).
239. See Goedhuis, supra note 22, at 21.
240. Tsipis, supra note i.
241. G.A. Res. 36/97C, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/97 (1981) (Prevention of an arms race in
outer space) [hereinafter cited as Western States resolution].
242. At the urging of the United States, the Committee on Disarmament was given re-
sponsibility for this negotiation instead of UN COPUOS (UN Committee on the Peaceful
Use of Outer Space) which had negotiated the Outer Space Treaty. The U.S view was that
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able agreement" to prohibit ASAT weapons. National technical
means of verification were not specifically referred to in this
resolution.
The Committee on Disarmament was bottlenecked over the is-
sue of whether or not a working Committee ought to be formed to
draft an agreement.' 43 Soviet bloc countries supported the creation
of the Working Committee. Western bloc nations, however, op-
posed its creation, claiming it was too early for such a committee to
accomplish anything productive. 2 "
6. Eastern Bloc Resolution. On the same day that the West-
ern States' Resolution was passed, a resolution introduced by
Mongolia was unanimously approved, with only the Western States
abstaining. 245 This resolution, in substance, reiterated the Eastern
bloc's desire for a treaty on the order of the Soviet Draft.
The passage of both resolutions on the same day illustrates the
Eastern preference for a broad ban on weapons in outer space and
the Western preference for a narrower agreement specifically
prohibiting anti-satellite systems.246 The fact that passage occurred
unanimously may indicate one of two things. First, both resolu-
tions may be acceptable to all nations, though certain nations prefer
one or the other. Second, it may be politically unacceptable for any
nation to actually vote against peace in outer space. It may be sub-
tler, and therefore more acceptable, for a country to in effect vote
"no" by creating a stalemate within the Committee on
Disarmament.
C. Views Since the UN Stalemate
1. At the UN COPUOS. The military implications of outer
space activities was not an item specifically on the COPUOS
agenda in 1982.247 One year after the resolutions were referred to
the UN Committee on Disarmament, "[a] number of [COPUOS]
since security in space is inseparable from security on earth, the issue is beyond the jurisdic-
tion of COPUOS.
243. See United Nations Committee on Disarmament, Report of the Committee, U.N.
Doc. CD/335 (Sept. 17, 1982).
244. Id.
245. G.A. Res. 36/99, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/99 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Eastern
States' Resolution].
246. E.g., Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons and Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space, 6 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B. 265-275 (1981).
247. Jasentuliyana, The Work of UN COPUOS in 1981, 10 J. SPACE L. 41, 46 (1982)
(Report of the Executive Secretary of UN COPUOS).
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delegations [still] expressed their concern regarding the growing
danger of military use of outer space, and pointed to the urgent
need to prevent an arms race in outer space. ' 248 Several delega-
tions still requested that the question be dealt with by COPUOS.
The U.S. and USSR, on the other hand, felt that the 1981 decision
to employ the Committee on Disarmament should still hold.249
2. Unispace '82. The Unispace '82 Conference was primarily
devoted to new civil technologies. 250 Although not initially an item
on its agenda, the Conference agreed to "express its grave concern
over the extension of an arms race into outer space and urged all
nations to contribute actively to the prevention of this."25' How-
ever, "[a]ttempts of a large majority of the countries to introduce
language to the effect that the testing and deployment of ASAT
weapons should be banned and that the inviolability of all peaceful
space activities must be guaranteed did not find a general consen-
sus." 25 2 It is not clear whether the failure to introduce the language
above was due to a problem in the language itself or instead to the
possibility that the UNISPACE '82 Conference was an inappropri-
ate forum.
3. 1982 Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space. At the 1982
Colloquium, the two views of space arms control embodied by the
1981 Resolutions were reiterated. The Western States still pre-
ferred regulating ASATs, while the Eastern countries still preferred
outlawing all weapons in outer space.253
4. Seventh International Arms Control Symposium. The con-
ference noted that the current escalation in the military use of outer
space, if continued, would probably change the strategic balance in
favor of the U.S. 254 From this premise, Colin Gray stated his belief
that "only a perfectly verifiable arms control regime does not look
very attractive compared to the U.S. prospective ability to compete
effectively militarily, in space. "255 Gray also noted the necessity of
"C31' vitality to both the U.S. and USSR in a superpower crisis.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Pal, Unispace '82 and Beyond, 10 J. SPACE L. 181, 183 (1982) (Report of the Secre-
tary-General).
251. ld at 185.
252. Id.
253. Diederiks-Verschoor, 25th Colloquium on Law of Outer Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 210
(1982)
254. Burton, The Seventh Int'l Arms Control Symposium: A Conference Report, 26 ORBIS
749, 755 (Fall, 1982).
255. ld. at 756.
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Gray proposed, therefore, that no treaties be negotiated that might
preclude the U.S. from developing an anti-Soviet "C3I" space sys-
tems capability.256
5. Space Law Session, 1982 International Law Association
Conference. At this conference, it was concluded that further esca-
lation in the military use of outer space would destroy the strategic
balance.257 Hence, the Conference supported the negotiations work
of the UN Committee on Disarmament.
D. Views in the United States Congress
The United States Congress has repeatedly voiced its support
for arms control. Most recently, several pieces of legislation specifi-
cally related to outer space have been submitted for consideration.
Rep. George Brown, Jr. (D-CA) introduced the National
Space Policy Act of 1983.258 This bill seeks to bolster civilian uses
of outer space, as opposed to military uses, in order to counter the
trend toward the weaponization of space.25 9 Further, the bill reiter-
ated the view that any use of ASATs would be illegal, and provided
for verification modeled on the French ISMA proposal.26 °
In 1982 Congressmen John Moakley (D-MA) and Harold Hol-
lenbeck (R-NJ) together introduced House Joint Resolution 607.261
This resolution called upon President Reagan to immediately enter
negotiations with the USSR and the rest of the nations of the world
to verifiably ban weapons of any kind from outer space. Resolu-
tion 607 also directs the President to "seek the establishment of a
working group with the United Nations Committee on Disarma-
ment . . . to provide a forum for discussing the issues . "262
256. Id
257. Goedhuis, Space Law Session, International Law Association Conference, 10 J.
SPACE L. 219, 220 (1982) (Report of the Chairman of the Space Law Committee).
258. H.R. 478, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (referred to the Committee on Science and
Technology).
259. Id
260. Id. In § 4, H.R. 478 states that: "the United States considers that the space systems
of all nations . . . are [their] property . . . and that infringement with space systems will be
viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights." In § 5 (b), H.R. 478 lists as among the U.S.
goals "the investigation ... [of] international cooperation in the use of remote sensing sys-
tems, including the fullest possible declassification of. . . data ....
261. H.J. Res. 607, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs).
262. Id. The Resolution provides that:
The President shall resume immediately bilateral talks with the Soviet Union
for the purpose of negotiating a comprehensive treaty prohibiting-
(1) the testing, deployment, production, or use of any space-based, air-based,
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Senate Resolution 43 similarly calls upon the President to
enter negotiations with the Soviets to ban ASATs.263 The Senate
resolution states, in relevant part, that "the President should imme-
diately prepare a proposal and invite the Soviet Union to negotiate
a verifiable ban on the development, testing, production, and de-
ployment of antisatellite weapons as a first step-toward prohibiting
all space-based and space-directed weaponry . . ..,"' Hence,
there is a substantial public support in the United States, as indi-
cated by the Congress, for ASAT measures.
III. CONCLUSION
The United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other na-
tions, each possess space assets which are of great value. This arti-
cle has striven to demonstrate that while the United States probably
has more assets which would be vulnerable to an operational
ASAT, the Soviet Union's increasing use of outer space make it
similarly, if somewhat less, vulnerable to an ASAT attack. More-
over, if ASATs were able to tamper with national technical means
of verification, the value of all current arms treaties would be
compromised.
This work has shown that some narrowly defined groups of
ASATs may be illegal today under positive international law.
However, the particular ASATs on which the Soviet Union and the
United States are presently concentrating efforts are not expressly
barred by current treaties, as construed under current modes of in-
terpreting those agreements.
While most authorities in the field of space weapons and space
demilitarization agree in the diagnosis that current treaties are in-
adequate to prevent ASAT development, these authorities disagree
on the course of treatment that should be prescribed. This author
firmly believes that Scoville's provisions for immediate consultation
are a useful beginning. However, the crux of the current impasse in
or ground-based weapons system which is designed to damage, destroy, or interfere
with the functioning of any spacecraft or any nation; and
(2) the stationing in orbit around the Earth, or any celestial body, or at any
other location in outer space of any weapon which has been designed to inflict
injury or cause any other form of damage on the Earth, in the atmosphere, or on
objects placed in space.
Any such treaty shall establish a procedure for verifying compliance with its
terms.
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negotiating positions is the fact that international law does not cur-
rently bind States in the same way that domestic law binds individ-
uals. Until the rule of law changes, the negatively defined treaty
offers the brightest hope of the ideas presented herein. If a treaty
were drafted in such a way that "all things not expressly allowed
are presumed to be barred," the current ruse of reading exceptions
into every agreement might be avoided. Similarly, Professor Chris-
tol's suggestion of closing the existing loopholes in the Outer Space
Treaty might offer an alternative solution. This writer awaits the
anticipated fall negotiation-perhaps it may offer an even better
result.
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